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in 1992 at over 19 billion checks. New settlement
rules adopted in 1994 caused the number of checks
processed by the Fed to fall sharply, to a low of 15.5
billion in 1995.2 Although the Fed’s processing
volume rose annually between 1995 and 1999, in
1999 the Fed handled 17.1 billion checks and vol-
ume has since been declining steadily.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 requires the
Federal Reserve to charge fees for providing pay-
ments services, including check processing, to cover
(i) the Fed’s expenses and (ii) imputed taxes and
profits that would be earned by private firms provid-
ing similar services. Because of declining volume,
the Federal Reserve recently determined that it must
reduce the number of its offices that process checks
to remain in compliance with the cost-recovery
requirements of the Monetary Control Act.
Legislation taking effect in October 2004 has
the potential to reduce further the volume of paper
checks processed by the Federal Reserve. The Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act, or Check 21, creates
a new negotiable instrument, called a substitute
check. Substitute checks are printed reproductions
made from digital images of the original paper
checks and are the legal equivalent of the original
checks. The legal status of substitute checks will
facilitate the truncation of checks and greater use
of electronic check processing. It will thus replace
some of the physical movement of paper checks
from the banks where checks are cashed or deposited
to the banks on which they are drawn or returned.
2 Rules were implemented through the Fed’s Regulation CC on
January 3, 1994, that enabled collecting banks to receive same-day
settlement by presenting checks directly to paying banks by 8:00 a.m.
Checks cleared by the Fed declined 13.3 percent in 1994, as banks
found it advantageous under the new rules to switch some clearing
of checks to private clearinghouses. 
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n 2000, U.S. consumers, businesses, and
government entities made some 71.5 billion
non-cash payments, with a value of approxi-
mately $46.6 trillion. Paper checks accounted for
about 60 percent of the total number of non-cash
retail payments, with credit and debit cards and
automatic clearinghouse (ACH) payments making
up the remainder. Approximately 29 percent of
checks were deposited or cashed at the same
depository institution on which they were drawn,
so-called “on us” checks. Of the remaining 71
percent, a high percentage were processed by the
Federal Reserve System, moving physically through
one or more Fed check processing facilities, which
are located in Federal Reserve Banks, Branches, and
dedicated processing offices.1 In 2002, the Federal
Reserve processed some 16.6 billion checks, gener-
ating $759 million in revenue and $744.3 million
in expenses for the System (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 2002, pp. 128, 139).
Both the number of checks written and the
number processed by the Federal Reserve have been
declining since the late 1990s, as payments are
increasingly made electronically. Survey data show
a decline in the number of checks paid from 49.5
billion in 1995 to 42.5 billion in 2000, the last year
for which data are available, while the number of
electronic payments increased by 14.2 billion items.
Between 1995 and 2000, the share of total non-cash
payments made by checks declined from 77 percent
to 60 percent (Gerdes and Walton, 2002). The number
of checks cleared by the Federal Reserve has also
been declining. The Fed’s processing volume peaked
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1 These data are based on comprehensive surveys of payments activity
sponsored by the Federal Reserve. See Gerdes and Walton (2002).
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The Monetary Control Act sought to use market
discipline to improve the efficiency with which the
Fed provides payments services. If the demand for
its paper check processing continues to fall, the Fed
will face intensified pressures to reduce its costs if
it is to remain in compliance with the Act. This article
investigates patterns in the efficiency of Fed check
processing operations over time, and it introduces
a new technique for estimating efficiency that over-
comes estimation problems inherent in methods
used previously to examine the efficiency of Fed
payments services.
The next section describes the efficiency con-
cept used in this article. We then describe the pro-
cessing of checks by Federal Reserve offices and
discuss our empirical model and data. Subsequent
sections discuss alternative ways of estimating
efficiency, focusing on the nonparametric data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and order-m estimators,
and present estimation results and conclusions.
INPUT TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
This article examines changes in the technical
efficiency of Federal Reserve check offices over time.
A decisionmaking unit (a Fed check office in our
context) is input-inefficient if it uses more input to
produce a given quantity of output than the existing
technology requires. For production processes
involving a single input, input-technical inefficiency
is measured simply as the ratio of input actually used
to the minimum feasible input amount required to
produce a given amount of output. For processes
involving multiple inputs, inefficiency is measured
by the proportionate overuse of all inputs. 
Inefficiency can also be measured by the extent
to which an office produces less than the technically
feasible amount of output from given amounts of
input. The output of a Fed check office (e.g., the
number of checks processed) is largely outside the
office’s control, however, at least in the short run.
Hence, we focus on input technical efficiency, rather
than output technical efficiency. Although technical
efficiency is among the most frequently investigated
types of efficiency, a comprehensive analysis of Fed
check offices, or any other type of organization,
would require examination of a variety of perform-
ance measures.3
Thus far, evidence on the impact of the Monetary
Control Act on the Fed’s efficiency in providing
payments services has been mixed. That evidence,
which is discussed more fully in Gilbert, Wheelock,
and Wilson (2004), suggests that the Monetary
Control Act did not result in an immediate improve-
ment in the efficiency with which the Fed delivers
services. Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson (2004) find,
however, that Fed offices generally became more
productive during the 1990s, with considerable con-
vergence across offices. Nevertheless, that study also
finds that as of 1999, the median Fed office could
have feasibly reduced its input usage by about 30
percent without reducing output.4
Although Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson (2004)
find that, over time, Fed offices increased output
(e.g., checks processed) for given amounts of input
(e.g., labor and processing equipment), this increase
in productivity does not imply that Fed offices neces-
sarily became more efficient; that is, they did not
necessarily move closer to the production frontier.
The extent to which an office is (in)efficient is
reflected in the difference between the amount of
output the office actually produces and the amount
it could feasibly produce using available technology.
Technological improvement implies an increase in
the amount of output that can be produced for given
amounts of input, i.e., a shift in the production fron-
tier. Therefore, because of technological improve-
ment, an office could become more productive,
i.e., produce more output using given amounts of
input, without becoming more efficient, i.e., moving
closer to the production frontier.  In this article, we
control for changes in (estimated) technology to
determine whether Fed offices generally became
more efficient in terms of feasible production over
time. At the same time, we use newly developed
techniques for estimating efficiency and a longer
sample period than Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson
(2004).
3 Other measures of efficiency include allocative efficiency, which takes
account of input prices to determine the efficient mix of inputs, and
scale efficiency, which refers to operation at efficient scale. Other 
common efficiency measures include cost efficiency, which examines
the extent to which a firm minimizes total cost, given input prices and
output quantities, and profit efficiency, which examines the extent to
which a firm maximizes profit.
4 Estimates of average inefficiency obtained by this and other studies
of Fed check production range from less than 5 percent to 35 percent,
depending on the type of efficiency studied, estimator used, and sample
period.  Such estimates are in line with estimates of inefficiency for
private sector firms, including commercial banks.  See Berger and
Humphrey (1997) for a survey of research examining inefficiency
among private sector firms.
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Federal Reserve Check Processing
The clearing of checks involves receiving checks
from depositing banks (defined broadly to include
all depository institutions), sorting them, crediting
the accounts of depositing banks, and delivering the
checks to the banks upon which they are drawn.
Such “forward items” processing is the main source
of revenue and total cost for Fed check operations.
Some Fed offices process federal government checks
and postal money orders, as well as commercial
checks. Fed offices also process “return items”
(which include checks returned because of insuffi-
cient funds) and “adjustment items” (which arise
because of processing or other errors) and provide
various electronic check services, such as imaging
and truncation. Following other studies, we focus
on the forward processing of commercial and federal
government checks.
The methods we use permit estimation of the
efficiency of check offices with multiple outputs. In
addition to the number of forward items processed,
we also treat the number of endpoints served by a
Fed check office as an output. An endpoint is an
office of a depository institution to which the Fed
delivers checks; hence, the number of endpoints is
a measure of the level of service provided by a Fed
office. Presumably, an office serving many endpoints
provides a higher level of service than an office serv-
ing few endpoints. In this sense, check processing
is analogous to the delivery of mail by a post office.
The output of a post office is not simply the number
of items it delivers, but also the number of addresses
to which it delivers mail. A post office that delivers
mail to a single address provides a lower level of
service than an office that delivers the same quantity
of mail to several addresses.5
Federal Reserve offices incur a variety of costs
associated with the processing of checks. Estimation
of efficiency using statistical methods requires the
specification of a model of the production process
with a limited number of inputs. We follow Gilbert,
5 Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson (2004) provide statistical evidence
that the number of endpoints should be treated as a distinct, second
output of check processing.
Definitions and Measurement of Inputs
1. Personnel: number of employee hours
2. Materials, Software, Equipment, and Support
Expenditures are deflated by the following price measures to obtain physical units, which are then combined 
using a Tornquist index:
Materials: GDP implicit price deflator (seasonally adjusted, 1996 = 100)
Software: Private nonresidential fixed investment deflator for software (seasonally adjusted, 1996 = 100)
Equipment:
For 1979-89: PPI for check-handling machines (June 1985 = 100)
For 1990-2003: PPI for the net output of office machinery manufacturing (not seasonally adjusted, 
June 1985 = 100)
Support: GDP implicit price deflator (seasonally adjusted, 1996 = 100)
3. Transit (Shipping, Travel, Communications, and Data Communications Support)
Expenditures are deflated by the following price measures to obtain physical units, which are then combined 
using a Tornquist index:
Shipping and Travel: Private nonresidential fixed investment deflator for aircraft (seasonally adjusted, 
1996 = 100)
Communications and Data Communications Support: Private nonresidential fixed investment deflator for 
communications equipment (seasonally adjusted, 1996 = 100)
4. Facilities: Expenditures are deflated by the following price index: “Historical Cost Index”from Means Square 
Foot Costs Data 2000 (R.S. Means Company: Kingston, MA, pp. 436-42). Data are January values.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Planning and Control System documents unless otherwise noted.
Table 1
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Wheelock, and Wilson (2004), which in turn follows
Bauer and Hancock (1993) and Bauer and Ferrier
(1996), in defining four distinct categories of inputs
used in the processing of forward items and serving
endpoints: (i) personnel; (ii) materials, software,
equipment, and support; (iii) transit; and (iv) facilities.
Our model requires estimates of the physical quanti-
ties used of each input rather than total expenditures.
Table 1 describes how we construct each of the four
inputs using expense data for each Fed check facility;
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the four
inputs and two outputs. Our data include quarterly
observations spanning 1980:Q1–2003:Q3 for each
Fed office that operated at any time during this
period. Because of changes in the Fed’s cost account-
ing system, there are discontinuities in the data at
the ends of 1994 and 2000. Hence, we report sum-
mary statistics for 1980:Q1–1994:Q4, 1995:Q1–
2000:Q4, and 2001:Q1–2003:Q3 separately.
ESTIMATING EFFICIENCY
Statistical estimation of efficiency requires a
model relating production inputs and outputs. Many
studies estimate translog cost or profit functions
that include a two-sided random noise term and a
one-sided random inefficiency term. The translog
functional form has been shown to misspecify cost
relationships for several types of firms, however,
including commercial banks (see, e.g., McAllister
and McManus, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 2001).
Instead of estimating translog or other parametric
functions, some studies use nonparametric methods
to estimate efficiency. An estimate of inefficiency
for an individual office consists of a measure com-
paring that office with an estimate of best practice.
Common nonparametric estimators of the produc-
tion frontier are the data envelopment analysis (DEA)
and the free disposal hull (FDH) estimators. Non-
parametric estimators do not require specification
Summary Statistics for Inputs and Outputs
Mean Median Variance Minimum Maximum
1980:Q1–1994:Q4
Checks (1000s) 80,734 69,985 2.25e9 10,413 265,631
Endpoints 430 366 9.33e4 32 1,686
Personnel (hours) 35,686 28,741 6.63e8 4,905 201,529
Material, etc. 1,899 1,567 1.30e6 155 7,403
Transit 1,509 1,328 8.14e5 148 6,678
Facilities 716 485 3.62e5 63 4,438
1995:Q1–2000:Q4
Checks (1000s) 93,267 85,324 2.19e9 17,205 280,006
Endpoints 351 339 4.21e4 32 1,262
Personnel (hours) 30,827 26,825 3.41e8 5,478 111,204
Material, etc. 2,008 1,658 1.82e6 373 10,630
Transit 484 372 1.26e5 20 2,124
Facilities 741 561 2.94e5 129 3,991
2001:Q1–2003:Q3
Checks (1000s) 104,579 96,559 2.70e9 18,253 292,891
Endpoints 314 290 2.85e4 92 955
Personnel (hours) 27,931 22,930 2.57e8 4,357 111,497
Material, etc. 2,597 2,303 2.11e6 424 9,853
Transit 516 403 1.14e5 111 1,805
Facilities 935 780 3.98e5 160 3,870
Table 2
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of a particular functional relationship between pro-
duction inputs and outputs. DEA and FDH do impose
certain assumptions about the shape of the produc-
tion surface, or technology, however, and applica-
tions often require very large data sets to obtain
meaningful efficiency estimates. DEA and FDH are
also highly sensitive to extreme observations and
noise in the data.6
The order-m estimator proposed by Cazals,
Florens, and Simar (2002), by contrast, is robust to
extreme values and noise. Further, the order-m esti-
mator imposes fewer assumptions on the shape of
the production surface than DEA. Perhaps most
importantly, for large numbers of inputs and outputs,
the order-m estimator requires far less data to obtain
meaningful estimates of inefficiency than do frontier
estimators, such as DEA or FDH. This section presents
non-technical descriptions of DEA and order-m
estimation. Readers interested in detailed treatments
are referred to Cazals, Florens, and Simar (2002) and
Wheelock and Wilson (2003).
Data Envelopment Analysis
DEA uses observations on outputs and inputs
of decisionmaking units (e.g., firms or, in our appli-
cation, Federal Reserve check offices) to estimate
the most productive combinations of outputs and
inputs that are technically feasible, i.e., “efficient”
combinations. The inefficiency of specific firms can
be estimated by comparing their actual input/output
combinations with efficient combinations. The more
input a firm uses to produce given quantities of out-
put (or, equivalently, the less output a firm produces
from given quantities of inputs) relative to an efficient
combination, the less efficient is the firm.
Figure 1 illustrates the technique for estimating
the relationship between input and output for a
production process that has one input and one out-
put. The dots represent observed levels of input and
output for eight firms. If we had complete informa-
tion about the minimum level of input that firms
require to produce a given level of output, we could
trace out the true production frontier. We could then
assess the degree to which a particular firm is ineffi-
cient by measuring its distance from the frontier.
Given the amount of output produced, the ineffi-
ciency of a firm reflects the reduction in the input
the firm would use if it were on the frontier. Alterna-
tively, we could measure inefficiency in terms of the
increase in output a firm could produce, for a given
level of input, if the firm operated on the frontier.
Lacking complete information, we must assess
the efficiency of firms from observations of the
inputs and outputs of actual firms. We trace out the
estimated frontier in Figure 1 by connecting the dots
for firms A, B, D, and E. The only constraint we
6 See Simar and Wilson (2000) and Kneip, Simar, and Wilson (2003)
for discussion of the statistical properties of FDH and DEA estimators.
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impose on the shape of the estimated frontier is
that it does not include firms like C. More precisely,
we assume the frontier is convex, i.e., that any two
points on or under the frontier can be connected by
a line segment that never passes above the frontier.
Firm C is inefficient relative to the observed frontier
in the sense that it could feasibly produce the same
level of output using less input (or, equivalently, pro-
duce more output from the same amount of input).
We illustrate the DEA efficiency measure in
Figure 2. Consider the firm with the amounts of
input and output labeled C. That firm produces an
amount of output equal to the vertical distance 0H
using an amount of input equal to the horizontal
distance HC. If firm C were more efficient, it could
use less input to produce 0H output (or, equivalently,
use HC input to produce more output than 0H). The
extent to which firm C could improve is reflected
in the difference in the amount of input used by
firm C and the horizontal distance GC. Because we
do not know the location of the true frontier, how-
ever, we estimate the potential improvement in
efficiency of firm C as the difference between HC
and the amount of input that a firm (perhaps hypo-
thetical) located on the estimated frontier and pro-
ducing the same amount of output as firm C would
use (distance FC). To measure inefficiency, we divide
the distance HC by the distance HF. This ratio is
greater than 1.0 for all firms that lie off the estimated
frontier; and the larger this ratio, the less efficient
the firm.7
Estimation of the efficient frontier requires
certain assumptions. Standard assumptions, which
we impose here, are that (i) the production set is
convex and closed; (ii) all production requires the
use of some inputs, and both inputs and outputs are
strongly disposable; (iii) the observed set of inputs
and outputs for check processing offices results
from independent draws from a probability density
function with bounded support over the production
set; (iv) this density is strictly positive for all points
along the frontier; (v) starting from any point along
the frontier, the density is continuous in any direc-
tion toward the interior of the production set; and (vi)
the true frontier is smooth. Together, these assump-
tions define the data-generating process that pro-
duces sample observations, and permit statistical
estimation and inference about the unobserved
technology as well as the unobserved input distance
function.8
Order-m Estimators
As an alternative to nonparametric estimators
of the production frontier, such as DEA, Cazals,
Florens, and Simar (2002) propose estimators based
on the expected minimum input frontier of order m.9
Order-m estimators do not impose the assumption
that the production set is convex, and in addition
they permit noise (with zero expected value) in input
measures. Note that DEA estimates of the production
frontier can be severely distorted by extreme values.
Individual observations have much less influence
on order-m estimation. Further, for given numbers
of inputs and outputs, the order-mestimator requires
far less data to produce meaningful efficiency esti-
mates than DEA or FDH estimators.10
Consider again a production process involving
firms that use a single input to produce a single
output. In this case, the expected minimum input
frontier of order m is simple to estimate: (i) For each
7 This measure of productivity is the Shephard input distance function.
See Shephard (1970).
8 See Simar and Wilson (2000) for more detailed discussion of these
assumptions and the DEA estimator.
9 Order-m estimators can also be applied in the output direction, i.e.,
to estimate the expected maximum output frontier of order m.
10 Specifically, order-m estimators converge to their population counter-
parts at a rate equal to the square root of the sample size, which is far
faster than the convergence rates of DEA and FDH estimators in our
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firm, identify all other firms that produce at least
as much output as that firm. (ii) Draw m times, inde-
pendently, with replacement, from this set of firms,
identifying the firm among the m draws that uses
the minimum amount of input. (iii) Repeat step (ii)
k times. (iv) Compute the mean input usage of the
kfirms identified in the sampling of steps (ii) and (iii).
The estimated expected minimum input frontier
constitutes the means computed for each sample
observation.11 The estimated frontier will lie below
and to the right of the true order-m frontier, which
itself will lie below and to the right of the true pro-
duction frontier, as illustrated in Figure 3.12
For any given firm, an estimate of order-m ineffi-
ciency is obtained by computing the distance from
the firm to the estimated order-m frontier, as illus-
trated in Figure 3. A hypothetical expected minimum
input frontier of order m is traced out by the various
line segments as shown. For firm C, inefficiency is
estimated by the ratio AC/AB.13 In other words, based
on computation of the order-m frontier, firm C uses
100[(AC/AB) – 1] percent more input than the mini-
mum amount the firm could be expected to use.
Note that some firms might use less input than the
expected minimum amount, as illustrated by firm
E in Figure 3. For firm E, “inefficiency” is estimated
by the ratio DE/DF, which is less than 1. This firm
uses 100(DE/DF) percent of the expected minimum
amount of input, based on order-m sampling of all
firms that produce as much output as firm E. Finally,
note that some firms, e.g., firm G, might lie above
the true order-m frontier.14
ESTIMATION RESULTS
We present efficiency estimates based on both
the DEA and order-m estimators. For each quarter,
we use DEA to estimate the production frontier
from observations on all offices producing positive
amounts of both outputs (forward check items and
14 In the case of multiple outputs, the m firms are drawn from the set of
firms that produce at least as much of all outputs as the firm of interest.
When there are multiple inputs, the minimum input usage among m
firms is determined by a minimax algorithm. This minimum converges
to the FDH estimate of the production frontier as mapproaches infinity.
FDH differs from DEA only in that it does not assume the production
frontier to be convex. For a mathematically precise description of the
order-m frontier in the case of multiple inputs and/or outputs, see

















11 The choice of m and k will depend on the particular application at
hand, as discussed later.
12 The order-m frontier need not be convex, as illustrated by the “stair-
step” shape of the estimated frontier in Figure 3.
13 As with DEA, this distance corresponds to the Shephard (1970) input
distance function.
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endpoints).15 We then estimate the inefficiency of
each office using the DEA distance function estimator
described here previously. 
Our approach differs from that of Gilbert,
Wheelock, and Wilson (2004). Because we estimate
a production frontier for every period, we obtain
efficiency estimates for every office in every quarter
of our sample. By contrast, Gilbert, Wheelock, and
Wilson (2004) pool observations on Fed offices over
time and estimate a single frontier. Consequently,
they obtain efficiency estimates only for the final
period of their sample (1999:Q4). Gilbert, Wheelock,
and Wilson (2004) do produce distance function
estimates for every office in every period relative to
the single frontier, however, and changes in those
estimates over time reflect changes in the productiv-
ity of individual offices. Moreover, because pooling
effectively increases their sample size, the estimate of
the production frontier for the final period obtained
by Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson (2004) is probably
more reliable than our quarterly estimates.
Figure 4 plots the mean and median efficiency
(distance function) estimates across all offices in
each quarter. DEA efficiency estimates are greater
than or equal to 1, with an estimate of 1 implying
that an office is fully efficient. Larger estimates
imply lower efficiency. 
On average, Fed offices appear to have become
less efficient between 1980 and 1982, when the
pricing requirements imposed by the Monetary
Control Act were fully implemented. Efficiency
continued to worsen to a peak in the third quarter
of 1986. Mean and median efficiency then improved
to approximately their pre-1982 levels. From 1987
to 2003, mean inefficiency ranged between 5 and
20 percent in all but one quarter. That is, on average,
Fed offices used 5 to 20 percent more input to pro-
duce given amounts of output than DEA estimation
indicates was technically feasible. Thus, our estimates
suggest that Fed offices became less efficient when
the Monetary Control Act was first implemented, but
by the late 1980s inefficiency had stabilized. We find
little evidence to suggest that the Monetary Control
Act improved average efficiency in the long run,
though median inefficiency was low throughout the
late 1980s and 1990s before spiking in 1999 and
again in 2002-03. Indeed, our estimates indicate
that in several quarters more than half of Fed offices
were fully efficient.16
As noted previously, there are reasons to be
suspicious of DEA efficiency estimates, particularly
in cases where the number of observations used to
estimate the efficient frontier is small. The order-m
class of estimators provides another way of looking
at efficiency that is less sensitive to extreme-value
observations and small samples.17
Figures 5 and 6 plot quarterly mean and median
values of order-m distance estimates across all check
offices for four values of m. As with our DEA esti-
mation, for each value of m, we estimate a distinct
order-m frontier for each quarter using observations
on check offices for only that quarter. Recall that
the order-m distance estimate for any given office
in any period is obtained by comparing the actual
input usage of that office with the expected mini-
mum input usage of the office, where the expected
minimum is obtained by drawing k samples of m
offices that produce at least as much output as the
office of interest. The minimum input usage among
the m offices in each of the k samplings is recorded,
with the expected minimum input usage for the
office of interest calculated as the mean of the mini-
mums observed in each of the k samplings. We set
k equal to 200, which, by the law of large numbers,
should be sufficient to obtain accurate estimates
of the true mean without being computationally
prohibitive.
The order-m distance estimate for each check
office reflects the extent to which that office uses a
different amount of input to produce its output level
from the expected minimum input amount, as deter-
mined by the sampling algorithm described previ-
16 Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson (2004) find general improvement in
the productivity of Fed check offices from the late 1980s through the
1990s. Our results, in combination with those reported by Gilbert,
Wheelock, and Wilson (2004) suggest that the technology of Fed
check processing was improving.
17 Another reason to be suspicious of our DEA efficiency estimates is
that they appear to be heavily dependent on the assumption that the
production frontier is convex. We also used the FDH estimator, which
relaxes the assumption of convexity but is otherwise identical to DEA,
to estimate efficiency. Using FDH, we find that average inefficiency
of Fed offices ranged from 0 to 4 percent throughout 1980-2003 and
that the median inefficiency across Fed offices was always zero, i.e.,
that at least half of Fed offices were fully efficient in every quarter
(typically, some 90 percent of offices were found to be fully efficient).
Hence, our DEA estimates are strongly affected by the convexity
assumption. This may not be a bad assumption, but one might not
want to draw strong conclusions based on results that are so heavily
influenced by a single assumption.
15 Between 43 and 48 offices are used to estimate the frontier in each
quarter. A few observations were dropped because of missing data.
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ously. A distance estimate larger than 1.0 indicates
that the office uses more than the expected mini-
mum, whereas a distance estimate less than 1.0
indicates that the office uses less than the expected
minimum.  
In general, the order-m inefficiency estimate
for an office will be larger for larger values of m.
Because the offices in the sample drawn to compute
the order-m frontier produce at least as much output
as the office in question, and because offices that
produce more output typically use more input, the
minimum input usage among m offices will tend to
be smaller, the larger the number of offices sampled
(i.e., the larger the value of m). Hence, the expected
minimum input usage for any given office will gener-
ally be smaller, and the less efficient the office will
appear to be, the larger the value of m. As Cazals,
Florens, and Simar (2002, p. 7) note, the choice of m
is arbitrary, but “a few values of m could be used to
guide the manager of the production unit to evaluate
its own performance” (p. 7). Here we are interested
in the performance of Fed check offices in general,
not specific offices, and the behavior of mean and
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largely invariant to the choice of m.18 Moreover, as
Figures 7 to 9 illustrate for 2003:Q3, efficiency esti-
mates for individual offices using different values
of m are highly correlated.
Although distance estimates and, hence, esti-
mated order-m efficiency, vary with the value of m
chosen, the trends in the mean and median values
are similar across the four values of m—first increas-
ing from 1980 to around 1987, then declining
through about 1998, and finally rising through 2003.
The changes in the trends are rather small, however,
relative to the quarterly variability in the mean and
median values, suggesting that the changes might
not be statistically significant.
Consistent with the DEA efficiency estimates,
Fed offices seem to have become somewhat less
order-m efficient when the pricing regime was first
introduced. For example, for m=5, the median
order-m distance estimate rises from approximately
0.73 in 1980 to 0.80 at its peak in 1987. In other
words, in 1980, the input usage of the median office
was 73 percent of the expected minimum amount,
whereas in 1987, the input usage of the median
office was 80 percent of the expected minimum
amount. Order-m efficiency began to improve in
the late 1980s, however, and continued to improve
during much of the 1990s, a pattern consistent with
the estimates of productivity obtained by Gilbert,
Wheelock, and Wilson (2004). Mean and median
estimates of order-m efficiency began to worsen
around 1999, and also became somewhat more
variable.
Mean and median efficiency estimates do not,
of course, tell the whole story. Figure 10 plots the
quarterly minimum, maximum, and median order-m
efficiency estimates alongside the variance across
Fed offices for m=5 (plots for other values of m look
similar). The plot reveals considerable variation
over time in the minimum and, especially, maximum
inefficiency estimates. In general, the variation in
efficiency estimates across offices declined after
the pricing regime was implemented in 1982, even
18 Cazals, Florens, and Simar (2002) show that the order-m frontier
converges to the FDH frontier as m approaches infinity. In our appli-
cation, median order-m efficiency is very close to 1 in every period
for m=50, consistent with our finding that approximately 90 percent
of all Fed offices are located on the FDH frontier in every period. The
location of a high percentage of observations on the FDH (and DEA)
frontier reflects a “curse of dimensionality” that plagues nonparametric
frontier estimation when the combined number of inputs and outputs
is high relative to the number of observations.
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as mean and median inefficiency worsened through
about 1987. After 1990, however, efficiency estimates
became more dispersed until about 1994. Since
then, dispersion has varied considerably from
quarter to quarter.
DISCUSSION
We have examined the technical efficiency of
Fed check offices over a long period that involved
numerous environmental changes. The major
environmental change of the early 1980s was the
implementation of the pricing requirements of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980. Both our DEA and
order-m estimates suggest that, if anything, Fed
offices became less efficient on average after full
implementation of pricing in 1982. Efficiency had
begun to improve by the late 1980s, however, and
Fed offices generally became more efficient during
the 1990s. 
Federal Reserve check processing volume has
been declining since 1999—a trend that is expected
to continue, especially with enactment of the Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act. Our results indicate
that the input-technical efficiency of Fed offices
declined on average after 1999, with increased dis-
persion across offices. Because it is difficult and
costly to reduce input amounts quickly, one would
expect to observe a decrease in the efficiency of an
office experiencing a sharp drop in check processing
volume. Hence, one should be cautious about draw-
ing strong conclusions about performance from
short-run fluctuations in estimated efficiency.
While our results provide information about
changes in the technical efficiency of the average
(and median) Fed check office over time, it is impor-
tant to note that we do not examine other types of
efficiency or performance measures. For example,
a measure of “overall” efficiency would capture both
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency—
which takes into consideration the feasibility of
substituting among input types in response to shifts
in relative input prices. One could also examine
scale efficiency, which reflects the extent to which
offices produce an efficient level of output.19
Further, while we have extended the standard
model used to examine the efficiency of check
office production by including the number of end-
points to which a check office delivers checks as a
second type of output, our model cannot account
for all differences in the operating environments
or production of different check offices. Hence, as
is the case with any empirical study of efficiency,
differences in estimated efficiency across offices
necessarily confound true differences in inefficiency
that might be within the ability of managers to con-
trol with factors that are largely beyond control. For
example, although we account for differences in
the number of endpoints across offices, we do not
control for differences in the geographic dispersion
of endpoints served by Fed offices that could explain
differences in their use of transportation input.20
Nevertheless, while an examination of the causes of
observed differences in estimated efficiency across
offices is beyond the scope of the present study, the
methodology described and illustrated in this article
provides a framework for identifying differences
that could help guide managers in their search for
ways to control costs.  
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